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Knowing that religion does not furnish grosser bigots than law, I expect little
from old judges.
Thomas Jefferson
PAST PROLOGUE

The Congress of the reconstruction era, like many an earlier and later
Congress, found its ends only too frequently frustrated by decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States. In an attempt to subordinate
the high court to popular will, various devices were brought forth
to curb the power of the Court. None of them-the problem of the
McCardle case1 to one side-proved successful. But they remain of
interest, if for no other reason than because of history's tendency to
repeat itself.
One of the stalwarts of the attack on the Supreme Court in the Civil
War reconstruction period was John A. Bingham of Ohio, a leader of
the Radicals in the House of Representatives. Bingham has, especially
since the recent reconstruction of reconstruction history, emerged as
one of the minor heroes of the battle to secure post-Civil War civil
rights. His role as Court baiter, however, has remained relatively
obscure. He is celebrated more for his part in the impeachment of
President Johnson and for his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 That it should turn out to be the Supreme Court rather than
Congress that has ultimately vindicated Bingham's views is one of the
minor ironies of history.3
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
1 Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318 (1867), 7 Wall. 506 (1868).
2 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" To Vote, and the
Understandingof the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33.
3 On the problem of the ironies of history, it might not be amiss, at this period of our
national difficulties, to refer once again to R. NIEBUHR, TIH IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY
(1952), although it has nothing to do with the subject of this review.
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In 1867, Bingham proposed "sweeping away at once the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in all cases." 4 And, if this failed, he was ready to
turn to more drastic action:
If, however, the Court usurps power to decide political questions and defy a free people's will, it will only remain for a
people, thus insulted and defied, to demonstrate that the servant is not above his lord, by procuring a further Constitutional Amendment and ratifying the same, which will defy
judicial usurpation, by annihilating the usurpers, in the"
abolition of the tribunal itself.5
Thus spoke the "liberals" of that day.
Since nothing came of these proposals, the attack was renewed in
1868, when the House Judiciary Committee reported a bill-apparently a duplicate of one that had been offered in the previous
Congress-that would require a two-thirds majority before the Court
could declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Again Bingham was
in the forefront of the movement to curb the Court. His statements
were appropriately characterized by Charles Warren as "a savage onslaught." The bill passed the House by a substantial majority, but
foundered in the Senate.
Bingham's third major effort along these lines, in the next Congress,
has received almost no attention. But it is of peculiar interest because,
in its essentials, it foreshadowed the Roosevelt Court-packing plan, although no connection between the two is anywhere suggested. In the
first session of the forty-first Congress, Bingham proposed an amendment to the Senate Judiciary Bill. The amendment read in part as
follows:
[I]f any judge of any of the courts of the United States whose
age now exceeds seventy years, or who shall hereafter arrive
at the age of seventy years, shall for one year after the passage
of this act, or after arriving at the age of seventy years, continue to hold his office without [applying for retirement], it
shall in either of such cases be the duty of the President to
nominate and appoint, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, an additional judge for the said court, who shall
have the same power and perform the same duties and receive
the same compensation as the judge then acting in such court,
• . . and shall, in connection with or in the absence of his

senior associate, hold the courts prescribed by law for said
4 2 C. WA~mEN, THE SUMREmE COURT IN UNTE

5 Id.
6 Id. at 467.

STATEs HSToRY 449 (rev. ed. 1937).
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senior . .. judge; and upon the decease of said senior . . .

judge, or upon his ceasing for any cause to hold said office,
the said additional judge appointed under the provisions of
this act shall be and become the judge of such court. .... 7
The debate on the floor of the House centered on the question of
constitutionality. This in turn rested on an interpretation of the bill's
proposals. If it really did no more than provide relief for superannuated or debilitated judges who voluntarily surrendered their posts,
as the proponents argued, there seemed no concern about the amendment's validity. On the other hand, all seemed to agree that the
Justices of the Supreme Court-for discussion quickly recognized the
target of the proposed amendment-could not be compelled to retire.
The case for unconstitutionality was, as a result, dependent on the
compulsory nature of the dispossession of office. Representative Kerr
made the argument in opposition:
The man who is thus superseded by the appointment of
another judge is practically retired from office, and he, if not
we, will so understand it. He and the country will understand when his successor is thus appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate that he himself is notified that
his services are no longer needed on the bench; that he is
superannuated, and no longer fit to discharge the duties nor
to be trusted with the responsibilities of the office. It will be
so understood by him and the country and it ought to be so
understood by them, for that is what it means. It is an attempt, by indirection, not to increase the number of judges,
so as to augment their working capacity to do the business
of the court, but it is personal in its application to certain
members of the court, and it is a mode devised to get rid of
them, to retire or supersede them. Those are the judges over
the prescribed age of seventy years....
It seems to me that this provision will introduce into our
judicial system and into the control of Congress over it a
most dangerous principle of interference, one that will go
to the very fundamental idea upon which that court was
organized, upon which its great service as a coordinate department of Government must always rest. It will go directly,
most logically and most dangerously to disturb the independence of that department of the Government, and to place it,
as well as all others, under the power of the legislative department, and I submit that it was that very fear, an apprehension of that very danger, a prescience of what is this day done,
7 CONG.

GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1869).
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that led the framers of our Constitution to incorporate the
provision organizing that court precisely as it is. In this opinion I am not unsustained by the history of this provision in
our Constitution."
Kerr thereupon turned to Story to point out that the Constitutional
Convention specifically rejected an authorization for Congress to remove judicial officers "for inability to discharge the duties of office."
And he, at least, had no doubt that the bill was proposing to do exactly what the Constitution forbade.
Again the bill, with the amendment, passed the House of Representatives, but failed to pass the scrutiny of the Senate. What did pass
was a bill authorizing voluntary retirement on pension, which could,
like the rejected amendment, be considered a devious means of accomplishing the same result as removal from office, but this time by
way of bribe rather than coercion.
Needless to say, perhaps, the Court was shortly thereafter reconstituted. For time is always on the side of those who would change the
Court's membership.
THREE ScoR. AND NINE YEARS LATER
What Leonard Baker has provided in his book Back to Back (the
relevance of the title eludes me) is a well-told tale of how the New Deal
reconstruction period recapitulated the history of the Civil War reconstruction period in this regard. Baker's story is a dramatic one.
Indeed, if Hollywood does not use it, it should certainly supply television-educational television?-with an excellent script. Its plot,
characters, suspense, conflict, heroics, pathos, triumph, and tragedy
all make for better literature than anything concocted by Andrew
Tully, Gore Vidal, or William Woolfolk. If it weren't for the absence
of a heroine and a want of "candid" description of sexual activities
that are the necessary ingredients of modern novels-and therein may
lie the relevance of the title-Back to Back would be an obvious
candidate for the best seller lists.
The origins of the Roosevelt Court-packing plan have been described best by Professor William Leuchtenburg, 9 whose scholarly
study of the subject of Baker's book will still be eagerly awaited.
History repeated itself without recognizing that it was doing so. Once
again all the various devices for limiting the power of the Court were
8 Id. at 341-42.
9 Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966

Sup. CT. R.sv. 347.
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considered and found wanting: constitutional amendment, legislative
withdrawal of jurisdiction, requirement of more than a majority to
invalidate a statute, and, penultimately, appointment of one additional
Justice for each member of the Court over the age of seventy. The
ultimate solution was to be found in Congressman Hatton Sumner's
bill authorizing retirement at full pay.
That the Court-packing plan-the appointment of one additional
Justice for each member of the Court over the age of seventy-was
made after rejection of all the other possibilities is documented by a
letter from Roosevelt to Felix Frankfurter:
As a matter of fact, the decision was arrived at by a process
of elimination. The amendment process, as you will remember, was fought bitterly by the conservative element through
the past four years-the only concession being a few words
from Landon which meant absolutely nothing. It is interesting to note that these same people this week are demanding
the amendment method in place of any other.
The reason for the elimination of the amendment process
was to me entirely sufficient: to get two-thirds of both Houses
this session to agree on the language of an amendment which
would cover all the social and economic legislation, but at the
same time would not go too far, would have been most difficult. In fact, the chance of a two-thirds vote in this session was
about fifty-fifty.
Supposing such an amendment had passed at the close of
this session, every state legislature would have adjourned for
the year. In 1938, only about one-third of the legislatures
meet and because of the Congressional elections in 1938 the
issue would, in all probability, be delayed in enough states to
make ratification in 1938 impossible.
That brings us to 1939. The chances are that quite aside
from this issue an unwieldy Democratic majority in both
Houses will be slightly reduced as a result of the 1938 elections. Any such reduction would be used as an argument
against ratification thus, in all probability, leaving the
amendment unratified up to and through the 1940 national
election.
If I were in private practice and without a conscience, I
would gladly undertake for a drawing account of fifteen or
twenty million dollars (easy enough to raise) to guarantee
that an amendment would not be ratified prior to the 1940
elections. In other words, I think I could withhold ratification in thirteen states and I think you will agree with my
judgment on this.
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It is my honest belief that the Nation cannot wait until
1941 or 1942 to obtain effective social and economic national
legislation to bring it abreast of the times, avoid serious labor
troubles, maintain farm prices, raise the purchasing power of
the "one-third of the population that is ill-housed, ill-clad
and ill-nourished."
After this elimination, I searched through all the other proposals for legislative action and almost at once came face to
face with the problem not of the Supreme Court but of the
whole Federal Judiciary. From this it was a logical step to
build up a program covering the whole judiciary impartially.
You will realize that in this process, I eliminated the suggestions of compulsory retirement, seven-to-two decisions, etc. as
being, in all probability, unconstitutional per se.10
There was an added fillip. For the plan purported to derive from
a suggestion made by McReynolds when he was Attorney General of
the United States:
When James McReynolds as Attorney General in 1914
suggested that the federal judiciary be enlarged on a temporary basis by the appointment of a co-justice for every justice over seventy, he was on ground made somewhat firm by a
historical practice of juggling with the size of the Supreme
Court. This apparently is what made the device so intriguing
when Cummings came across it in late December, 1936, and
sold it to FDR as the device with which the Court could be
humbled."
Baker was not quite accurate on this score. The McReynolds plan was
intended to apply only to lower court judges. But the joy of seeing
McReynolds hoist on his own petard was too good an opportunity to
be missed.
Like all good stories, Baker's tale is complex. There are three major
confficts that underlie the plot. And each overlaps the other. One is
the contest between the President and the Court. The second is the
struggle between the President and Congressional leaders for domination of the Democratic party and the government. The third rivalry
is between the liberals and the conservatives, both within and without
the Democratic party. It is this complexity that makes it difficult to
discover who, if anyone, was the winner of the Court-packing controversy.
10 ROOSEVELT & FRANKFURTER: THEm CORmESPON ENCE, 1928-1945, at 381-82 (Freedman
ed. 1968).
11 P. 134. See also Leuchtenburg, supra note 9.
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Who were the heroes? That, too, is hard to say. Certainly consideration must be given to Burton K. Wheeler, the Montana Democrat
who led the fight against Roosevelt at the risk of losing his seat. (He
did later lose his seat but not because of the court problem.) Wheeler
had earlier proposed a constitutional amendment to provide for Congressional veto of Supreme Court decisions. For what was he fighting
then? Not to preserve the power of the Court. To extend the authority
of Congress:
If the Court were to be attacked and attacked successfully,
it would lose power; that must be the purpose of the attack.
Who should gain the power the Supreme Court lost? The
answer to this question revealed why so many members of
Congress who were angry with the Court were not angry
enough to side with Roosevelt. Under the Roosevelt plan,
the power lost by the Court would be picked up by the Presidency.... In contrast, Congress wanted the power lost by the
Court to rest with Congress. 12
Wheeler won the skirmish in the Senate, but he lost his influence
with the White House and became one of the isolationist leaders of
Roosevelt's later terms. Was the Court fight a contributor to the decline and fall of what was once regarded as a great liberal leader?
Something must be said for Senate majority leader Joe Robinson,
who sacrificed his life in battling for the President's cause, in which
he did not believe. But again the action was not completely unselfish.
He knew that he was to succeed to a vacancy on the bench, especially
if it were created as a result of the bill. His death signalled the end of
the battle in the Senate. It was doubtful that the bill could have been
successfully carried under his leadership. With the further rift created
by the contest between Barkley and Harrison for succession to the
leadership post, passage of the bill became impossible.
Perhaps then there were no heroes in this battle, except for the
always heroic figure of Franklin D. Roosevelt. But there were a few
clearly defined villains, of whom Mr. Justice McReynolds is dearly
the most obvious. In any event he was certainly an easy choice for the
role. It would be hard to find a more despicable character to have occupied the bench in the history of the Court. And the fact that he was
appointed, along with Brandeis, by Woodrow Wilson--one of the most
idealistic of all American presidents--gives adequate warning that
"Court packing" is a dangerous game at best.
Even so, Baker's case against McReynolds is somewhat dubious.
Baker, who accuses the "Four Horsemen" of being separated from the
12 P. 139.
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"real world" is a bit naive himself about the ways of the Court. He
quotes from McReynolds' dissent in Nebbia v. New York: " Plainly,
I think, this Court must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment.
At least, we must inquire concerning its purpose and decide whether
the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within the
legislative power-whether the end is legitimate, and the means appropriate." 3 Of this, Baker says: "In all the duel between the Supreme
Court and Franklin Roosevelt there was perhaps no more arrogant
statement than these words of James McReynolds. Not the Court but
the people through their elected representatives determine the wisdom
of legislation."' 4 And yet, if any two sentences could be taken from a
Supreme Court opinion to define the behavior of the Warren Court
and many of its predecessors, none would come closer to the truth than
these uttered by McReynolds.
One thing is dear, however. In totaling up winners and losers, there
can be no doubt that McReynolds goes into the losing column. But
there are other clear-cut "bad guys." Herbert Hoover was one of them,
as he sought to return to the White House by leading the successful
Republican defense of the Court. His motives and objectives were
those of personal gain, undiluted by principle. Wiser heads than his
in the Republican party understood that if they were to make a party
issue of the question Roosevelt's victory would be assured. And Baker
most adequately describes their use of silence as a political tactic. On
the other side of the political fence, it is Jim Farley who gets the
booby prize, for in addition to his failure adequately to measure the
President's strength in the Senate was a repeated demonstration of
arrogance that cost some of the support he might otherwise have garnered.
Most of the people involved don't wear either white or black hats.
Lyndon B. Johnson plays a strange role. Running to fill a House
vacancy, right in the middle of the Court controversy, Johnson campaigned as a New Deal supporter, in the face of the opposition to
F.D.R.'s program by the powerful figures in the Texas Congressional
delegation: Vice-President Garner, Senators Tom Connolly and Morris Sheppard, and Representatives Sam Rayburn and Hatton Sumners.
Johnson won his seat and his spurs. "The New York Times carried a
front-page story the next day about the victory of 'youthful Lyndon B.
Johnson, who shouted his advocacy of President Roosevelt's court
reorganization all over the Texas Tenth District.' ",5 Baker makes
13 291 US. 502, 556 (1934).
14 Pp. 125-26.
15 P. 188.
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more of this election than it probably deserves, at least in terms of its
relevance to the story he has to tell. He argues that Roosevelt looked
upon this as clear evidence of the support of the American public for
his program. There was more substantial evidence of the absence of
a groundswell for packing the Court. But more fateful than the effect
on Court packing, was the leg-up that Johnson thereafter received
from Roosevelt toward a political career that neither could have expected to lead to the White House.
Brandeis, too, took an unusual part in the drama. Committed to a
vow of silence that he believed appropriate for a Supreme Court
Justice, he broke it to join Hughes in a letter, prepared without the
consultation of six of the brethren, for use by Wheeler in his testimony
against the plan. Brandeis is credited by Baker with a loyalty to the
institution that overcame his dislike for his colleagues' abuse of it.
Some might think that a plan that invoked age as a test of disability
could not help but antagonize the oldest member of the Court. For
many, as for Frankfurter: "That Brandeis should have been persuaded to allow the Chief to use his name is a source of sadness to me
that I need hardly dwell on to you.""'
The apostasy that hurt most, however, was Herbert Lehman's letter
to Senator Wagner expressing his opposition to the Court-packing
plan. Here is part of the exchange between Roosevelt and Frankfurter
on the subject:
Dear Frank:
Last night I tried to reach you by phone, and, on the
whole, I am glad that I did not succeed. For I'm afraid I
would have used language hardly decorous over the wire. I
was-and am-hot all over regarding Herbert Lehman's
letter. Some things aren't done-they violate the decencies of
human relations and offend the good taste and the decorum
of friendship. And so I was-and am-"hot"-but less with
anger than with sadness. ...
Dear Felix:
If you had got me on the telephone your language would
have been just like Bernie Baruch's when he heard of the
Lehman episode. Like you, I have no anger but only sadness.
If I were British I would say only one thing--"it isn't
cricket" ...Y
The Lehman letter itself was by no means crucial to the outcome.
It made it quite clear, however, that the battle was not simply one
16 ROOSEVELT & FRANarxuaRT,
l7 Id. at 403-04.

supra note 10, at 392.
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between liberals and conservatives. Lehman's statement of opposition
undoubtedly derived from a desire to protect the Court as an institudon. But it helped instead to bring about a victory of Congress over
the President, who had in fact already won his battle with the Court.
Unlike many other opponents in this cause, Lehman apparently was
forgiven by F.D.R.
Why did the plan fail? There are a multitude of reasons offered.
First, was the point made early in his book by Baker:
Actually FDR had begun his Court fight clumsily. Five
years earlier, when he was first campaigning for the Presidency, [Senator Key Pittman] had written him: "Everyone
now understands what you stand for. Be careful not to confuse the issue." FDR's political technique was in line with
this advice. When he announced a policy, proposed legislation, took on a political fight, everyone knew what he was
doing and why. With the Court fight, however, Roosevelt had
lapsed. His emphasis in his message of February 5 on the
inability of the older justices to carry their fair share of the
work misrepresented the issue and confused the people. He
had been too tricky.' 8
For this reason he had difficulty in getting popular support.
A second reason was that the conservatives in his party had become disenchanted with Roosevelt and saw an opportunity to beat
the President with no sacrifice of their own power. Hatton Sumners,
the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was prepared to sabotage the Senate bill if it ever passed the upper house. Ashurst, the
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, undermined the possibility of success by dragging out the hearings. Garner, sulking in his
Texas tent a good part of the time, lifted no finger to help. And none
of the organized Presidential constituencies, labor, agriculture, etc.,
was prepared to put pressure on their legislators to secure this goal.
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the plan was
that its stated goal was accomplished without the need for legislation.
Indeed, if one views the war as solely between the President and the
Court, the President was dearly the victor. The Court had changed
its tune and had begun to sustain New Deal legislation hardly distinguishable from that which it had theretofore struck down. Van Devanter had resigned, pursuant to Hatton Sumner's bill that gave full
salary on retirement. Indeed, it is hard to see why Roosevelt pressed
on with his plan after the capitulation of the Court had taken place.
The continuation of the contest suggests the validity of Baker's major
18

P. 47.
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theme, that the essential nature of the contest was between the executive and the legislature. And this is borne out by the nature of the
report filed by the Senate Judiciary Committee only hours after the
announcement of Van Devanter's resignation:
The report began with the President's assertion that the
purpose of his bill was to infuse new blood into the Court.
The report rejected this, saying that the purpose was to persuade justices over seventy to resign. It continued, lashing out
at FDR and his Administration for presenting "a needless,
futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional
principle" when it sent the Court bill to Congress. The bill's
"ultimate purpose," said the report, "would be to make this
Government one of men rather than one of law, and its practical operation would be to make the Constitution what the
executive or legislative branches of the government choose
to say it is-an interpretation to be changed with each change
of administration." Rarely-perhaps never-had a committee
of Congress, controlled by the same political party as the
White House, spoken so sharply and so critically of the action
of the man in the White House. Even then, the report was
not done. Its dosing line was without equal. "It is a measure," said the report of the Court bill, "which should be so
emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives of the free people of Amer19
ica."
LOOKING BACKWARD

Three decades later, a different conclusion might be drawn than that
which would seem so apparent to those keeping score in 1937. It would
have appeared then that Roosevelt had chastened the Court and been
subdued by Congress. It looks now that what Congress did was to
preserve the mystique of the Court as an untouchable institution, however political its actions and motives, not at the expense of the executive power but rather to the cost of legislative authority. Roosevelt
went on to turn the government of the United States from what Wilson had called "legislative government" to what is now readily perceived as "presidential government." And the Court, freed from the
threat of interference by legislature or executive, has returned to its
old ways, abiding by McReynolds' description of its function, although
on behalf of a different dientele than that which was served by the
"Four Horsemen."
19 Pp. 229-30.
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Baker's book is indeed a fascinating story. It is well worth reading
by those who appreciate that not all constitutional doctrine is made
in the courts. And the doctrinaire may find bases for doubts about
their doctrine. For the book affords further evidence that the law of life
is neither logic nor experience.

